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Introduction
In the Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe
(DSMS)1 the Commission outlines possible legal
approaches to the challenges of digitization.2 It explic-
itly mentions ‘ownership’ respectively ‘rights to use
data’ as an aspect.3 This gives rise to the question of
data ownership.
Building of a data economy as part of the
strategy for a Digital Single Market
The DSMS is based on three ‘pillars’ and pursues three
major objectives:4 first, a better online access for con-
sumers and businesses to goods and services through-
out Europe (in particular better access to digital
content, modern and more European copyright); sec-
ondly, creating the right conditions for thriving digital
networks and services; and, thirdly, making the best
possible use of the growth potential of the European
digital economy. The third objective shall be reached by
three measures: On the one hand the build-up of a data
economy, on the other hand the increase in competi-
tiveness through interoperability and standardization
and thirdly an inclusive digital society. An important
aspect in building a data economy (also referred to as
‘data-based economy’ in the Commission Staff
Working Document5) is the question of which prop-
erty-like rights concerning data exist or should exist.
This is also explicitely addressed in the DSMS.
Technical background
The DSMS also addresses basis of the data economy, ie
the relevant new technologies and business models:
mass data processing (Big Data), cloud services, data--
driven science and the Internet of Things.6 The
Commission Staff Working Document (SWD) addi-
tionally points out: ‘Data has become a new factor of
production, an asset and in some transactions a new
currency.’7 Data became a separate production factor
and an economic asset. A key role belongs to the ‘tran-
sition to a smart industrial system (Industrie 4.0)’.8 The
so-called Industrie 4.0, ie the fourth industrial revolu-
tion after mechanization, division of labour and auto-
mation, is thus a decisive factor. It is characterized by a
widespread, direct networking of ‘intelligent’ objects via
the Internet.9 The SWD explicitly highlights that it in-
volves not only industrial production but also agricul-
ture.10 In addition to the networking of objects
(Internet of Things), the Commission identifies ‘digital
services such as cloud computing’ and ‘big data (includ-
ing data-driven science and geo-spatial data)’ as addi-
tional aspects driving the transformation process.11
Legal aspects
The DSMS mentions four areas of law as sources rele-
vant to the construction of the data economy:12
(I) restrictions on the free movement of personal
data (in particular in relation to the physical
location of the data), ie data protection law;
* Email: lstzech-ius@unibas.ch.
1 European Commission, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe,
Communication, COM (2015) 192 final, 6 May 2015.
2 Digitization is understood as the growing importance of information tech-
nology in every sector of the economy and all aspects of everyday life. Cf.
ibid, 3: ‘The global economy is rapidly becoming digital. Information and
Communications Technology (ICT) is no longer a specific sector but the
foundation of all modern innovative economic systems.’
3 ibid, 14 ff.
4 ibid, 3 ff.
5 European Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe—
Analysis and Evidence’, Staff Working Document SWD (2015) 100 final,
6 May 2015, 57.
6 European Commission, Communication, above, n 1, 14.
7 European Commission, SWD, above, n 5, 59.
8 Ibid, 57.
9 Acatech, ‘Securing the Future of German Manufacturing Industry:
Recommendations for Implementing the Strategic Initiative INDUSTRIE




(accessed 1 September 2015). Cf U Sendler (ed.), Industrie 4.0, 2013; P
Br€autigam and T Klindt, ‘Industrie 4.0, das Internet der Dinge und das
Recht’ (2015) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1137.
10 European Commission, SWD, above, n 5, 57.
11 Ibid, 58.
12 European Commission, Communication, above, n 1, 14 ff.
VC The Author(s) (2016). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
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(II) copyright provisions whose inconsistent imple-
mentation is seen as an obstacle;
(III) rights to use data (examined in more detail be-
low); and
(IV) the allocation of liability in relation to aspects
other than personal data.
In addition, the initiative ‘Free flow of data’ has been
announced. This initiative will address restrictions on
the free movement of data for reasons other than the
protection of personal data and unjustified restrictions
regarding the physical location of storage and process-
ing of data, whereas amongst other things the ‘emerging
issues of ownership’ are explicitly addressed again.13
It should be noted that some important areas of law
for a data economy are not mentioned, specifically con-
tract and competition law (unfair competition law and
law of competition).
Building a data economy as a legislative
task
Possible rights to use data are to be seen as part of a
comprehensive legal framework for a data economy. To
illustrate that, I will explain how a data economy
actually works or could work. Next, typical situations
where data are treated as goods are characterised from
a legal perspective. Finally, the relevant areas of law and
their respective functions are identified.
The value chain for Big Data issues:
production, collection and analysis of data
The development of information technology has greatly
lowered the cost, size and weight of sensors, memory el-
ements, networks, computers and control elements.
Therefore data can be, so to speak, incidentally stored,
transmitted and analysed in view of generating revenue.
The impact of these technologies can be three main as-
pects can be distinguished. First, conventional physical
goods come with data references. For example, simple
cars become ‘driving computers’. This often involves
the addition of ‘smart’ technologies, and affects a broad
range of commercial objects and everyday items, such
as vehicles, manufacturing machinery, agricultural ma-
chinery, mobile phones, home furnishings and even
clothing (wearables). Secondly, conventional physical
goods are increasingly replaced by data (digital content
rather than traditional media), for example in the form
of e-books, e-papers or streaming services. This in turn
has an impact copyright (and the first pillar of the
DSMS). Thirdly, data is also traded as a novel good in
its own right. Data economy not only means data-
driven or data-controlled economy (since the control of
economic processes through data has existed for a long
time and has acquired a new quality through network-
ing), but also an economy with data itself as a type of
good.
Not only processed data or information, but also so-
called ‘raw’ or ‘machine data’ 14 is traded as economic
goods. Such data is automatically recorded, and by ana-
lysing large quantities of such data new insights can be
gained. Analysing raw data represents the core of so-
called Big Data applications. Raw data becomes a ‘com-
modity’15 which is traded in a data economy. As a re-
sult, the question of transferable rights of use becomes
important. The value chain of these applications can be
divided into the production of data (by operation of
sensors, either deliberately or incidentally); the collec-
tion of data; the analysis by statistical evaluation and,
only as an intermediate result, innovations based on the
resulting insights.16
Rights of use, or exclusive rights, intervene at differ-
ent levels according to their conditions and their effects.
Classic IP law (especially patent law, but also copyright)
operates only at the level of the innovation process
(more precisely at the stage of invention, not upstream
at the conception stage or downstream at the level of
the product).17 The core question in the debate on
rights to use data is therefore whether exclusive legal
protection should intervene at the stage of data produc-
tion prior to any innovation.
Companies and consumers as parts of the
value chain
There are two potential actors in a data economy: com-
panies and consumers. Although the State plays an im-
portant role, especially in data protection law, its role
shall not be further addressed in this article.
Concerning public information, special public law pro-
visions exist, namely the rules on freedom of
13 Ibid, 15.
14 Term based on M Becker, personal communication, September 2015.
15 V Mayer-Scho¨nberger and K Cukier, Big Data—A Revolution That Will
Transform How We Live, Work and Think (John Murray 2013), 5; W
Dorschel and J Dorschel, ‘Chapter Title’, in J Dorschel (ed), Praxishandbuch
Big Data, Wirtschaft—Recht—Technik (Springer Gabler 2015) 1, 6 ff, 9.
16 Indirectly derived innovations can be inventions (technical innovations),
copyright protected works (cf A Wiebe, ‘Der Schutz von Datenbanken -
ungeliebtes Stiefkind des Immaterialgu¨terrechts’ (2014) volume(issue)
Computer und Recht 1 para 9) or other innovations. The term innova-
tion is used in the broader sense comprising the whole process leading
from ideas to inventions to new products/innovations in the narrower
sense.
17 H Zech, ‘Life Sciences and Intellectual Property: Technology Law Put to
the Test’ (2015) 7 ZGE/IPJ Zeitschrift fu¨r Geistiges Eigentum/Intellectual
Property Journal, 1, 3.
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information (access to information) and further pro-
cessing of information.18 The relationship between
these rules and potential private-sector rights to use
data may, however, pose special problems.
Companies as well as consumers can appear as con-
cerned parties, ie as party to which the data relates. If
the party is an individual, they are the ‘data subject’
within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the General Data
Protection Regulation proposal.19 In this case the data
is ‘personal data’. Companies and consumers can also
be producers of data. With the proliferation of complex
devices consumers become increasingly important as
data producers, whether as operators of ‘smart cars’20
or carriers of ‘wearables’. Within the Industrie 4.0 com-
panies become data producers, even if their corporate
purpose is different altogether.
Data is regularly analysed only at business level, re-
gardless of the source of the data. In addition to deter-
mining whether the data is personal in nature (in which
case data protection law would be applicable), interme-
diary data trade relies on the distinction between con-
sumer-generated and company-generated data.
In what follows I will address the question whether
the source of data affects the legal scope of rights to use
the data.
Creation and regulation of data markets
The role of law in data markets can be examined from
two different perspectives, depending on the function
of law. On the one hand, law may restrict free data traf-
fic. Due to the primary objective of the European
Union to eliminate trade barriers, this perspective pre-
vails for the DSMS.21 Restrictions on data traffic derive
from regulation, in particular data protection law, but
also from intellectual property rights. On the other
hand, law enables data traffic in the first place. This is
true of regulatory law which creates clear ‘rules of the
game’, but also of contract law, competition law and in-
tellectual property rights law which create markets for
incorporeal assets by allocating transferable rights. Thus
the main focus of this article is not to keep the legal
framework for a data economy as slim as possible, but
to create an appropriate legal framework for a data
economy, and in particular for a functioning data mar-
ket. As I will show later, there are good reasons why
such a framework includes rights to use data.
The essential aspects of the legal framework for a
data economy mentioned by the DSMS are data protec-
tion law, copyright (if the sui generis right for the maker
of a database is considered as a part of copyright since
the individuality requirement for the protection as a
work is usually not met), rights to use data (for a defi-
nition see the next section) and liability law. On the
one hand, the task of the law is to ensure that data mar-
kets exist (since the exchange and use of data are desir-
able); on the other hand, its task is also to minimize
regulatory risks for market participants (especially con-
sumers). Contract law, consumer protection law and
competition law need to be mentioned in this context.
In particular, the relationship between companies and
consumers is not just about protecting consumers as
data subjects in terms of data protection law, but it is
also about fairness in data transactions, whether per-
sonal or corporate data.
What is the meaning of ‘data ownership’
or ‘rights to use data’?
Before delving into rights to use data—whether existing
rights or those yet to be created—we must define the
term. This section clarifies the term ‘data’ and deals
with the concept of right to use.
What is data? Data as an object of rights
In its simplest meaning, the term data can be defined as
machine-readable encoded information.22 The defini-
tion of data as a legal object or as an economic good is,
however, key to answering the question whether there
should be rights to data at all.23
A distinction can be made on the level of meaning
(semantic information), such is the case with personal
data defined as information relating to a person (Article
4(2) of the General Data Protection Regulation pro-
posal24). Know-how is also considered to be semantic
information, when defined by its meaning.
18 See A Wiebe and E Ahnefeld, ‘Zugang zu und Verwertung von
Informationen der —ffentlichen Hand’ (2015) Computer und Recht 127
and 199.
19 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection
Regulation proposal), COM (2012) 11 final, 25 January 2012.
20 About rights to use data in ‘smart cars’, see G Hornung and T Goeble,
‘Article Title’ (2015) Computer und Recht 265.
21 European legislation concerning exclusive rights usually refers to Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated Version), 2008 OJ
C 115/47, Art 114 (TFEU) as the basis of competence. Also data protection
aims at eliminating trade barriers. The DSMS, COM (2015) 192 final, 6
May 2015, 14, argues from this angle too, but also states that there is a ‘lack
of clarity over rights to use data’ which not only concerns their function as
a market barrier but also as an instrument for the creation of markets.
22 H Zech, Information als Schutzgegenstand (Mohr Siebeck 2012), 32.
23 Like information data as an object of rights can be defined on three dif-
ferent levels: meaning, signs and physical carrier; H Zech, ‘Information
as Property’ (2015) 6 Journal of Intellectual Property, Information
Technology and E-Commerce Law 3, 192, 194.
24 General Data Protection Regulation proposal, above, n 19.
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The term ‘data’ can also be defined on the level of
signs (syntactic information), regardless of its meaning.
As a legal object, sequences of ‘zeros’ and ‘ones’ would
be protected, either as a file or as a data stream. This
distinction is comparable to other syntactic representa-
tions of information, such as text (defined by its sym-
bols rather than meaning).
Rights to use data
Rights to use data or property-like rights concerning
data (‘ownership’) are to be understood as the alloca-
tion of data by means or at least along the lines of ex-
clusive rights. Ownership rights as comprehensive
rights to tangible property and ‘classic’ intellectual
property rights such as patent law and copyright law
serve as exemplary models. They are supplemented by
less clearly contoured neighbouring rights, as well as
unfair competition law.
In addition to a clear definition of the subject mat-
ter, allocation of economic value is another important
criterion allowing us to determine the existence of a
property-like allocation of legal powers over an object
or good. For example, interferences with legal claims re-
sult not only in claims for damages, but also give rise to
disgorgement of profits25 based on unjust enrichment
and assumed agency and the transferability of rights
(which is not necessary for the allocation of economic
value where licensability suffices). There is a hierarchi-
cal relationship between transferability and allocation
of economic value, since transferability of rights re-
quires allocation of economic value. However, the latter
does not presuppose the former. Rather, it is sufficient
if the right confers commercial use in other ways than
by transferring them completely. At the very least it is
required that the subject matter is transferable de facto,
so that the assigned powers may actually be exercised
by a person other than the right-holder, which for ex-
ample is also true of certain personality aspects like
one’s own image (defined semantically).
The question as to under what conditions per-
sonal rights may be regarded as assignable rights is
important for data protection which in its original
function is a personal right closely connected with the
right to privacy.
Data protection as a right to use data?
Data protection legislation has been harmonised at the
EU level, and data protection law is due to be fully har-
monized by the proposed General Data Protection
Regulation.26 The regulatory purpose of data protection
law, as is clarified in the first recital of the proposed
General Data Protection Regulation, is the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data. The formulation of the relevant fundamental
rights guaranteed in Article 8(1) EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights27 and Article 16(1) Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)28 is mis-
leading with regard to the wording: ‘Everyone has the
right to the protection of personal data concerning him
or her.’ This however does not in particular mean the
protection of data, but rather the protection of the per-
son against any danger caused by the use of their per-
sonal data.
However, some scholars argue that current data pri-
vacy protection law could be further developed into a
data property right, meaning that its function is thus
expanded from a mere protection of personality to a
participation in the economic value of personal data.29
When developing further data protection into rights to
use data of the persons concerned (data subjects), sev-
eral problems arise. On the one hand, data protection
law does not allocate all personal data exclusively to
the person concerned. Currently there is no such thing
as ‘right to one’s own data’, ie no personal right to
any information concerning oneself, as it is recognized
in the relation between individuals and the State in the
form of the fundamental right to informational self-
determination.30 Data protection law protects the
25 See T Helms, Gewinnherausgabe als haftungsrechtliches Problem (Mohr
Siebeck 2007), 25 ff; A Peukert, Gu¨terzuordnung als Rechtsprinzip (Mohr
Siebeck 2008), 402 ff, 512; cf R Ellger, Bereicherung durch Eingriff (Mohr
Siebeck 2002), 890 ff; F Hofmann, ‘Gewinnherausgabe bei
Vertragsverletzungen’ (2013) 213 Archiv fu¨r die civilistische Praxis 469;
JF Hoffmann, ‘Zum vermo¨gensrechtlichen Schutz absoluter und relativer
Rechtspositionen an der Schnittstelle zum Immaterialgu¨terrecht’ (2014)
Juristische Ausbildung 71.
26 General Data Protection Regulation proposal, above, n 19.
27 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/01.
28 TFEU, above, n 21.
29 B Buchner, Informationelle Selbstbestimmung im Privatrecht (Mohr
Siebeck 2006), 202 ff; W Kilian, ‘Wie der Staat unsere Daten schu¨tzen
kann’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (4 July 2014), available at http://
www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/netzwirtschaft/vom-recht-auf-die-eige
nen-daten-13025525.html (accessed 10 October 2015); cf K v Lewinski,
Die Matrix des Datenschutzes (Mohr Siebeck 2014), 50 ff. R
Schwartmann and C-H Hentsch, ‘Eigentum an Daten - das
Urheberrecht als Pate fu¨r ein Datenverwertungsrecht’ (2015) RDV
Recht der Datenverarbeitung 221. For the US discussion regarding data
protection as "quasi IP" see L Henry Scholz, ‘Privacy as Quasi-
Property’ (2015) Iowa Law Review, Forthcoming’; S Balganesh, ‘Quasi-
Property: Like, But Not Quite Property’ (2012) 160 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1889; P Samuelson, ‘Privacy as Intellectual
Property’ (1999) 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1125
30 D Klippel, ‘Deliktsrechtliche Probleme des Datenschutzes’ (1983) BB,
407 (408); S Simitis, ‘Die informationelle Selbstbestimmung -
Grundbedingung einer verfassungskonformen Informationsordnung’
(1984) NJW 398, 400; H Ehmann, ‘Informationsschutz und
Informationsverkehr im Zivilrecht’ (1988) 188 AcP 230, 266 ff; C
Hohmann-Dennhardt, ‘Wem geho¨ren personenbezogene Daten?’ (2009)
DSB 13, 14.
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personality only against certain forms of data process-
ing. In principle, contracts about personality rigts are
permissible, although only with obligatory effect.31
This raises the central question of whether a mere ref-
erence to personality can actually a sufficient justifica-
tion for the allocation of transferable exclusive rights
in dealing with one’s own personal data.
Absence of right to one’s own data
Data protection law does not allocate comprehensive
rights of use over one’s own personal information; it
only addresses certain forms of data processing, which
potentially entail a serious interference with personal
rights. In relationships between private persons, Article
6(1)(f) of the General Data Protection Regulation pro-
posal plays a pivotal role. It shows that data protection,
like many personal rights, is a law open to interpreta-
tion (ie interventions can be justified by balancing con-
flicting interests).
A complete allocation of one’s own data (semanti-
cally defined by reference to their own personality)
would be inconsistent with constitutionally protected
freedom of expression and information. The German
Federal Supreme Court summarizes this succinctly in
the Spickmich.de judgement:
However, the individual has no absolute, unrestricted con-
trol over its data; because it develops its personality within
the social community where information, even if it is per-
sonal, is a part of social reality which cannot be exclusively
assigned to the person concerned alone.32
Property-like allocation of economic value
In terms of legal consequences, the question is whether to
assign to the person concerned, a position procured by
current data protection law, with the allocation of eco-
nomic value (which under German doctrine is among
other things important for claiming profits in case of a
violation). The personal right of the protected person is
certainly not transferable (unlike the right of publicity
recognized in the USA). However, since with the consent
of the person concerned illegal data processing becomes
legal according to Article 6(1)(a) of the proposed General
Data Protection Regulation, there is a possibility of giving
such consent and by doing so entering into a contractual
obligation within the limits of contract control. Thus the
concerned party can use his/her position similarly to
other personal rights (‘personality licensing’).33 However,
the ability to conclude binding agreements is severely
limited by the free revocability of consent,34 which shall
also be codified in Article 7(3)(1) of the General Data
Protection Regulation proposal. Problems might also
arise if a consent given in return for services would be
deemed non-voluntary or imbalanced.
Despite the option of revoking consent, the pro-
tected person may exploit protected personal data by
granting consent: for instance, the revocation of a given
consent pursuant to Article 7(3)(2) of the General Data
Protection Regulation proposal deploys no retroactiv-
ity. Personal data defined by its semantic content is in-
separably connected to the protected person, but it can
be detachable from that person just as his/her picture
is, because it can be processed without that persons’s
continued involvement. Data protection arguably works
as an allocation of economic value.35 However, there is
is no clear cut property like allocation of data, resulting
from data protection law but rather a personality right
open to balancing all interests concerned. One can at
best speak of a ‘right to the protection of personal data’
(ie open to balancing with conflicting interests) but not
of a property-like ‘right to one’s own data.’36
Justification
The background of the discussion about data protection
as a property like right is a justification issue. Is the
mere fact that an economic good is semanticly related
31 A Ohly, ‘Volenti non fit inuria-Die Einwilligung im Privatrecht (Mohr
Siebeck, 2002), 141 ff, 165 ff, 259 ff; H Beverley-Smith, A Ohly and A
Lucas-Schloetter, Privacy, Property and Personality (Cambridge
University Press 2005), 94 ff; F Hofmann, ‘The Economic Part of the
Right to Personality as an Intellectual Property Law? - A Comparison
between English and German Law’ (2010) 2 Zeitschrift fu¨r Geistige
Eigentum/Intellectual Property Journal 1.
32 BGHZ 181, 328 ¼ NJW 2009, 2888, “www.spickmich.de”. In original:
Allerdings hat der Einzelne keine absolute, uneingeschr€ankte
Herrschaft u¨ber ‘seine’ Daten; denn er entfaltet seine Perso¨nlichkeit
innerhalb der sozialen Gemeinschaft. In dieser stellt die Information,
auch soweit sie personenbezogen ist, einen Teil der sozialen Realit€at
dar, der nicht ausschließlich dem Betroffenen allein zugeordnet wer-
den kann.
33 For contracts on personal rights Ohly, above, n 30, 165 ff, 259 ff;
Beverley-Smith et al, above, n 30, 129 ff, with further references.
34 The consent regulated in German Federal Data Protection Act,
Bundesdatenschutgesetz (BDSG), s 4(a) is in general freely revocable and
the possibility of revocation cannot be waived effectively in advance, P
Gola and R Schomerus, BDSG - Bundesdatenschutzgesetz
Kommentar (12th edn CH Beck 2015) s 4 para 38; T Herbst, ‘Die
Widerruflichkeit der Einwilligung in die Datenverarbeitung bei medizi-
nischer Forschung’ (2009) MedR 149, 150. This applies at least in cases
where the person concerned realizes the consequences of the data process-
ing only after granting such consent, S Simitis, ‘Commentary on BDSG’,
s 4 in P Gola and R Schomerus, BDSG - Bundesdatenschutzgesetz
Kommentar (8th edn CH Beck 2014) s 4 para 94.
35 W Kilian, ‘Personal Data: The Impact of Emerging Trends in the
Information Society - How the marketability of personal data should
affect the concept of data protection law’ (2012) CRi 169, 172; Zech,
above, n 22, 219 ff.
36 See eg KH Ladeur, ‘Datenschutz - vom Abwehrrecht zur planerischen
Optimierung von Wissensnetzwerken’ (2000) DuD 12, 18: ‘not a per-
sonal right but part of a of a new kind of property right’ (‘nicht dem
Perso¨nlichkeitsrecht zugeordnet . . ., sondern als Bestandteil eines neuar-
tigen Eigentumsrechts.’).
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to a person reason enough that the value should belong
to that person? From a Lockean perspective mixing a
good with one’s own personality is sufficient. Copyright
can be justified by the traces of personality in the work.
However, the work is also created by the author which
provides a crucial economic rationale for copyright
protection. Personal data are linked to a person by their
meaning but are not created by that person.
The question of whether the protection of personality
justifies an economic allocation cannot be discussed in
more detail here. However, it seems that with the current
configuration of many personal rights, with the allocation
of economic value on the side of legal consequences, and
on the side of legal facts the maintenance of prerequisites
that are open to consideration, the limit of an allowable
approach on property rights has been reached. The most
weighty argument may be that real property-like rights
can be withdrawn even against the will of the entitled le-
gal entity, for example in the event of foreclosures.37 This
must not be possible with personal rights, at least if the
right-holder her- or himself has not exploited them (sim-
ilarly to copyright). Even contracts should not automati-
cally render data protection ineffective. The validity of a
consent to data processing given in consideration for
services free of charge has to be determined on a case to
case basis. When consent is given as a contractual term
which has not been individually negotiated it may be an
unfair term depending on the circumstances.
Protection of trade secrets
With the proposal of a directive on the protection of
undisclosed know-how and business information (trade
secrets),38 the protection of trade secrets is the subject
of European harmonization efforts. Although data may
qualify as trade secrets, the protection does not lead to
a real data use right. Especially with Big Data matters
this leads to problems.
Data as a protected secret
One of data protection requirements is that the data con-
stitute a trade secret. This requirement automatically
applies to collected data, provided that it is business-related
(where storage as part of business operation is a sufficient
justification), that it is non-obvious and that there is an ex-
pressed or at least recognizable intention to keep secrecy
and an economic interest in the confidentiality by the busi-
ness holder. All these conditions can also be met if the
manufacturer of a complex machine keeps the data col-
lected by the machine secret in respect of his/her clients.39
Where trade secrets are understood as ‘information’,40
there is a definition at the semantic level (as in data pro-
tection). However, it is not necessarily information about
the protected business (business-related information);
but rather any kind of information. The only precondi-
tion is that the company has the information legitimately
under its control (‘lawfully within their control’, Article
39(2) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); cf Article 2(1)(c) of
the draft Directive).41 It is sufficient that the business has
control over business-known secrets. Article 3(2)(a) and
Article 11(2)(e) of the draft Directive (and recital 6) ex-
plicitly mention ‘electronic files containing or imple-
menting the trade secret’ (syntactic information).
According to Article 2(1)(b) of the draft Directive a
trade secret must have a commercial value because of its
secrecy. According to recital 8, the definition of trade
secrets should not include any ‘trivial information’. In
case of individual measurement data it could be argued
that this does not yet have any commercial value but is
nonetheless trivial. This shows that recital 8 is based on
false premises: with Big Data, trivial information can
have economic value when there is enough trivial infor-
mation put together and analysed. The existence of a
market for such data is likely to disprove its worthless-
ness. Even raw data has value which, under certain cir-
cumstances, just happens to be very low.42 Since the
value of data does not have to exceed any minimum
quantitative threshold, the requirement of a commercial
value pursuant to Article 2(1)(b) of the draft Directive
should not be any problem and can be fulfilled. This, of
course, also is true for the requirement of commercial
interest under German law, for example to manufac-
turers of complex machines.
37 Peukert, above, n 24, 534 ff.
38 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the council
on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information
(trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure,
COM (2013) 813 final, 28 November 2013.
39 For the protection under criminal law as set out in German Penal Code,
s 202(a), see below. In addition, the protection of technical measures un-
der German Copyright Act, s 95(a) can be considered, provided that
there is a protected work or any other object protected by German
Copyright Act (database protected as work or by sui generis right). In any
case, data are not such a protected object, see below.
40 Draft Directive, COM (2013) 813 final, 28 November 2013, Art 2(1). Cf
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995), 1869 UNTS
299, Art 39(1) (TRIPS): ‘information’.
41 In the Draft Directive it reads ‘trade secret holder’, cf Draft Directive,
above, n 39, Arts 3, 9, 11 and 13. According to ibid, Art 2(1)(c), the defi-
nition of trade secret includes the idea that the protected information is
‘subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person law-
fully in control of the information, to keep it secret’. Ibid, Art 10(1) re-
quires a legitimate holder as well. The ‘legitimate holder’ is also
mentioned in ibid, recitals 3, 5, 6, 13–15 and 18.
42 K Neumann, ‘Es gibt kein belangloses Datum mehr!’ (2011) DANA
Datenschutz Nachrichten 44: ‘There is no trivial datum anymore!’
(‘Es gibt kein belangloses Datum mehr!’).
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Protective effect
Although protection of corporate secrets is considered
to fall at least in part into the category of intellectual
property,43 and although it was incorporated into
TRIPS by Article 39, it grants no genuine exclusive
right. In particular, protection of corporate secrets de-
pends on the factual existence of a secret, and thus
rather resembles the protection of possession.44 In addi-
tion, the information is not protected against any use,
but only against certain attacks on the secret.
With Big Data, the analysis of data by third parties
would necessarily imply an infringing disclosure, pro-
vided that the third party has no authorized access, for
example through the acquisition of data on the basis of
a know-how contract. Thus analysing data as a use of
secrets that have been obtained by violating secrecy or
by commercial espionage, would be included in the
protection of corporate secrets. It is appropriate that a
repeated measuring remains admissible because the
protection does not transfer exclusive powers to the in-
formation (incidentally, there are also exclusive rights,
allowing the independent re-creation of an object of
protection, cf Article 19(2) of the Community Design
Regulation45 for the unregistered Community design).
The legal position of the protected trade-secret holder
has property-like traits, as far as the allocation of eco-
nomic value is concerned. Although, according to the pre-
vailing opinion, no transferable right results, know-how is
at least factually transferable and thus can also be the ob-
ject of legal transactions and be economically exploited.46
Accordingly, an allocation of economic value, ie the possi-
bility of undue enrichment in case of injury, is affirmed.
When it comes to information which is detachable from
the business, such as data from automated measurements,
this is to advocate at least as a framework law.
Protection of trade secrets as an inadequate
legal framework
Protection of trade secrets does not cause an indepen-
dent legal allocation: it merely amplifies the existing de
facto exclusivity of data by protective rights. Therefore
one can indeed refer to the protection of corporate se-
crets as legal assignment to those parties who have a de
facto exclusive access to the data (recording or storing
party). However, any problems with the existing factual
situation tend to be reinforced thereby.
In Industrie 4.0 matters the allocation by the protec-
tion of trade secrets leads to problems: usually, there
are several businesses involved, whose respective secrets
are difficult to distinguish. From the point of view of
the user of complex manufacturing machines any gen-
erated data are the user’s trade secrets. From the point
of view of the manufacturer(s) of the machines, that
may by design exclude the users from access, it is rather
assumed to be their secrets. If several machines work
together or are linked, which is likely to be the rule, the
allocation becomes even more difficult.
The spatial expansion of the business sphere, ie the
impossibility to demarcate it by physical gates is an inev-
itable consequence of information technologies (IT)
(just think of cloud computing). What actually creates
problems is the delimitation of one operating sphere to
the other. A lack of transparency is currently one of the
main problems encountered in IT. This is true not only
for consumers but also for companies. And the problem
is further exacerbated by the protection of corporate
secrets. This gives reason for a cautious application of
trade secret protection to Big Data matters. The specific
criminal offences of the Penal Code, in particular ss
202(a) ff of the German Criminal Code (which are to be
complemented by an offence of ‘data receiving’) should
protect against the specific risks of IT for secrets.47
Sui generis right for the maker of a
database
By introducing sui generis protection for the maker of a
database according to Articles 7 ff of Directive 96/9/
EC,48 the European legislature addressed the problem
of data as an economic good. Subject matter, however,
is not the data itself, but the database or the investment
in the creation of a database. Unlike classical intellectual
property rights this right no longer protects a creation
43 See also A Ohly, ‘Der Geheimnisschutz im deutschen Recht: heutiger
Stand und Perspektiven’ (2014) GRUR 1, 3 ff.
44 M Dorner, Know-how-Schutz im Umbruch (Carl Heymanns 2013), 111;
M Dorner, ‘Big Data und "Dateneigentum" - Grundfragen des modernen
Daten- und Informationshandels’ (2014) CR 617, 619; A Ohly, above, n
43, 8; Zech, above, n 22, 241.
45 Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on
Community designs, OJ L 3/1, 5 January 2002.
46 Cf Dorner, above, n 44, 83 ff, 214 ff; Zech, above, n 22, 234 ff, each with
further references.
47 German BT-Drs 17/14362v 10 July 2013, GesE des Bundesrates, Entwurf
eines Gesetzes zur Strafbarkeit der Datenhehlerei, 7; RefE des
Bundesministeriums der Justiz und fu¨r Verbraucherschutz v. 15 May
2015, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einfu¨hrung einer Speicherpflicht und
einer Ho¨chstspeicherfrist fu¨r Verkehrsdaten, 19.
48 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
March 1996 on the legal protection of databases, OJ L 077/22, 27 March
1996. This sui generis right supplements the pre-existing copyright pro-
tection of databases (German Copyright Act, s 4-II). The requirement of
a substantial investment (German Copyright Act, s 87(a)-I) replaces the
requirements for copyright protection of an personal intellectual creation
(‘perso¨nliche geistige Scho¨pfung’) involving a selection or an arrange-
ment. The exclusive right is assigned to the investor (maker of a database,
German Copyright Act, s 87(a)-II).
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of the human mind, but the result of an investment.49
Case law has shaped the right for the maker of a data-
base in a way that it generally does not encompass the
use of data in Big Data issues, at least not to the data
generator.50 This is mainly due to the understanding of
significant investment as a condition for protection
which is reflected in the scope of protection.
Subject matter: database
In the case of automatically collected data no human
intellectual achievement is present. Therefore, in accor-
dance with Article 3(1) of Directive 96/9/EC, no data-
base work protected by copyright exists. By contrast,
the outcome of automated measurements and record-
ings to a database usually qualifies as a database (Article
1(2) Directive 96/9/EC).
Collection
Especially in the case of automated measurements not
only a useless collection of data is produced, but also a
structured arrangement of data.51 The files to be trans-
ferred, containing the data of individual devices and a
fortiori files created by merging data from multiple de-
vices, are in any case to be qualified as a collection.
Of independent works, data or other
materials
Independent materials are the data as single measure-
ments, ie differentiated on the semantic level. The legisla-
tor’s decision not to base the subject matter on individual
data is likely to be due to the fact that the legislator
wanted to keep the (semantic) information in the public
domain.52 An exclusive right to the individual semantic
information (as was discussed, for example, for the pro-
tection of daily updated news)53 cannot be justified. It
would have been easier, to base protection on the individ-
ual data and to distinguish them on the syntactic level.
The independence of materials, required to qualify a
collection as a database, is not a problem. Rather, it is al-
most a hallmark of Big Data where a large amount of
data is not immediately intended for a specific use but
optionally analysed later. Based on the Fixtures
Marketing jurisprudence,54 independence presupposes
that the individual elements can be used on their own.
This is true even of the most insignificant piece of data,
to the extent that it is a well-structured information
unit,55 ie a unit with semantic content.56 With the for-
mulation ‘independent works, data or other materials’
(‘Daten oder andere unabh€angige Elemente’, data or
other independent elements) the law assumes that at
least semantically determined data is automatically
independent.
If the criterion of independence is understood as in-
dependent usability the concept of goods comes into
play, ie not only the database, but also the single data or
element should represent independent goods. This dem-
onstrates the classic understanding of data use underly-
ing the regulation: collecting and processing go hand in
hand and as a result provide a collection of data easily
perceivable by users which therefore are usable data. The
Big Data paradigm, however, is the exact opposite: even
the most insignificant raw data already represent goods
that can only be used by subsequent analysis.57
49 A Steinbeck, ‘Immaterialgu¨terrechte und Informationsinteresse’ (2010)
KSzW 223, 224: Not just the creator of an intellectual effort, but anyone
supporting the creation and/or dissemination of information by contrib-
uting organizational effort and financial investment has a general interest
in early exclusive use and exploitation of information. (‘Nicht nur der
Scho¨pfer einer geistigen Leistung, sondern auch derjenige, der mit organ-
isatorischem Einsatz und finanziellen Investitionen dazu beitr€agt, dass
Informationen generiert und/oder verbreitet werden, hat regelm€aßig ein
Interesse daran, diese Informationen zun€achst ausschließlich selbst zu
nutzen und auszuwerten.’).
50 C Zieger and N Smirra, ‘Fallstricke bei Big Data-Anwendungen -
Rechtliche Gesichtspunkte bei der Analyse fremder Datenbest€ande’
(2013) MultiMedia und Recht 418, 420 (‘“relevant violation” as an “ex-
ception”’; in original: ‘“relevante Verletzungen” als “Ausnahme’”).
Wiebe, above, n 16, 1 ff, however shows that there are many Big Data sit-
uations without automated measurements and that the sui generis right
is highly relevant for Big Data situations (although not for the protection
of the data producer). Similarly, T Ehmann, ‘Big Data auf unsicherer
Grundlage - was ist "wesentlich" beim Investitionsschutz fu¨r
Datenbanken?’ (2014) Kommunikation & Recht 394, 395:
The case law has begun to shape the new protective right. Nevertheless,
the impact of the database producer right on the legal practice still lags
behind the economic significance of data as an asset.
Die . . . ergangenen ho¨chstrichterlichen Entscheidungen haben dem
neuen Schutzrecht inzwischen erste Konturen verliehen. Dennoch
hinkt die Bedeutung des Datenbankherstellerrechts in der Rechtspraxis
der wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung von Daten als Wirtschaftsgut hinterher.
It could be argued that the importance in legal practice lags behind
precisely because of the contouring, in particular due to ECJ, The
British Horseracing Board and Others, C-203/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:695.
51 Wiebe, above, n 16, 2.
52 D Thum and K Hermes, in A-A Wandtke and W Bullinger (eds), UrhR
Urheberrecht (4th edn CH Beck 2014), s 87(a) para 26; Ehmann, above,
n 50, 395: no ‘monopolization of (important) information’ (keine
‘Monopolisierung von (wichtigen) Informationen’). A Wiebe, in G
Spindler and F Schuster (eds), Recht der elektronischen Medien (3rd edn
CH Beck 2015, s 87(a) para 1.
53 See also H Prantl, Die journalistische Information zwischen Ausschlussrecht
und Gemeinfreiheit (Gieseking 1983), 36 ff.
54 Fixtures Marketing I, C-338/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:696; Fixtures Marketing
II, C-444/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:697; Fixtures Marketing III, C-46/02,
ECLI:EU:C:2004:694.
55 Thum and Hermes, supra note 50, s 87(a) para 13.
56 To that effect, see also T Dreier, in T Dreier and G Schulze,
Urheberrechtsgesetz Kommentar (5th edn, CH Beck, 2015) s 87(a) para 6.
57 Neumann, above, n 42, 44: ‘There is no trivial datum anymore!’ (‘Es gibt
kein belangloses Datum mehr!’).
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Systematic or methodical arrangement
In order to use individual data it is vital that databases
are structured in systematic or methodical order within
the data collection. This minor problem is solved if the
individual data is filed in a way that it can be re-
trieved.58 Thus, to meet this criterion, data has to be
compiled preserving its semantic value. It is, however,
extremely unlikely that a collection of data is arranged
in a way that the entire collection becomes unusable
and thus the requirement of a systematic or methodical
arrangement becomes a ‘de minimis criterion’.59
Protection requirement of substantial
investment
As investment represents a criterion, the sui generis pro-
tection is quite similar to unfair competition law, al-
though it is not equally flexible.60 The main reason why
sui generis protection did not have any significant im-
pact on Big Data applications might be that the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its deci-
sions BHB/Hill and Fixtures Marketing I–III established
a limitation to investments in existing data.61 Thus,
data producers cannot be a legal entity. Although nar-
rowing down the wide spectrum of criteria for protec-
tion rights, it is not comprehensible that investments in
data production are excluded.62 The production of data
could have easily been interpreted as acquisition.
The question whether side products of entrepreneur-
ial activity (‘spin offs’) can at all represent the subject of
necessary investment gives rise to a new problem.63 It is
a substantial characteristic of Industrie 4.0 matters that
the data is created incidentally. In its Autobahnmaut
(highway toll) decision64 the German Federal Court of
Justice had to judge a matter in which the database can
only be qualified as a side product and affirmed a sub-
stantial investment in the acquisition of data.
Irrespective of whether side products of entrepre-
neurial activity are subject to the regulations, it is rather
the criterion of substantial investment that does ex-
clude consumers from protection.65 With regard to Big
Data, this is problematic. As illustrated later the protec-
tion for data producers could also be outlined with-
out considering investments (be it in production or in
the collection of data) thus including consumers as
well.
Effect of protection
The object of protection (the data collection) is reflected
on the level of protective effect. Individual elements are
not protected. As a precondition significant parts either
in terms of quantity (volume of data) or quality (volume
of investment) have to be transferred (extraction, Article
7(2)(a) of Directive 96/9/EC). However, in such cases,
the alternative of repeated and systematic uses, which
conflict with a normal analysis of the database or unrea-
sonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker of
the database, can ensure legal protection.66 For an ex-
traction it is sufficient that the sum of transfers remains
below the materiality threshold but represents a ‘re-
peated and systematic extraction and/or re-utilization of
insubstantial parts of the contents of the database imply-
ing acts which conflict with a normal exploitation of
that database or which unreasonably prejudice the legiti-
mate interests of the maker of the database’ (Article 7(5)
of Directive 96/9/EC). It suffices if the on-going transfers
of insignificant parts are aimed at the eventual transfer
of essential parts and in the case of its continuation
would result in the fact that a substantial part of the
database would be extracted.67
A right for the producer of data (data
producer right) de lege ferenda
After analysing the existing legal framework, the question
arises whether a real right to use data should be created.
What such a data producer right (in the sense of a data
producer’s right) might look like shall be outlined briefly
58 Dreier, above, n 56, s 87(a) para 7; Thum and Hermes, above, n 52, s
87(a) para 21; A Auer-Reinsdorff, ‘Schutz von Datenbanken und
Datenbankwerken’, in I Conrad and M Gru¨tzmacher (eds), Recht der
Daten und Datenbanken im Unternehmen (Otto Schmidt 2014) 205, 213
ff.
59 Thum and Hermes, above, n 52, s 87(a) para 24.
60 Ehmann, above, n 50, 399; cf M Leistner, in O Teplitzky, K-N Peifer and
M Leistner, UWG Gesetz gegen den Unlauteren Wettbewerb
GroOˆkommentar (2nd edn 2013), s 4(9) paras 84, 131.
61 The British Horseracing Board and Others, C-203/02,
ECLI:EU:C:2004:695; Fixtures Marketing I, above, n 54; Fixtures
Marketing II, above, n 54; Fixtures Marketing III, above, n 54. See also M
Leistner, ‘Anmerkung zu EuGH, Urteil v. 9.11.2004 - Rs. C-203/02 The
British Horseracing Board ./. William Hill Organization’ (2005)
JuristenZeitung 408, 409; M Lehmann, ‘Abgrenzung der Schutzgu¨ter im
Zusammenhang mit Daten’, in Conrad and Gru¨tzmacher, above, n 58,
133, 138 ff; Ehmann, above, n 50, 397 ff; Wiebe, above, n 16, 4.
62 T Hoeren, ‘Anmerkung zum Urteil des EuGH v. 9.11.2004’ (2005) MMR
34, 35; M Leistner, ‘The protection of databases’, in E Derclaye (ed),
Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright (Edward Elgar 2009),
427, 438; Ehmann, above, n 50, 397: ‘According to the natural literal
sense gaining new data is a form of procurement as is the purchase of
data’ (‘Nach dem natu¨rlichen Wortsinn ist die Neugewinnung von Daten
ebenso eine Form des Beschaffens wie der Erwerb von Daten.’)
63 Cf Dreier, above, n 56, s 87(a) para 13; Ehmann, above, n 50, 397 ff.
64 BGH, GRUR 2010, 1004—Autobahnmaut.
65 However, if a benefit is granted for the production of data (use of a data
collecting equipment), it would be conceivable to assume an investment
of consumers. This investment would have to reach such an extent that
an independent economic good results (cf. A Auer-Reinsdorff, ‘Schutz
von Datenbanken und Datenbankwerken’, in Conrad and Gru¨tzmacher,
above, n 56, 205, 215 ff), which also applies to raw data.
66 Ibid, 219.
67 BGH, GRUR 2011, 724, 726 ff—Zweite Zahnarztmeinung II.
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below.68 It shall deal with subject matter, conditions, own-
ership, scope of protection, exceptions, transferability, re-
lationship with other legal regimes (like data protection)
and, last but not least, the question of justification.
A well-defined subject matter would be machine-
readable coded information that is defined only by its
representative characters (bits) irrespective of its con-
tent (data delimited on the syntactic level).
An important protection requirement would be the
creation of the data, meaning creation through auto-
mated measurement processes, intellectual activity or
simple computing power. An additional possibility
would be the limitation on measurement processes to
completely exclude intellectual creations and separately
regulate the problem of digital goods which are pro-
duced by processing power (particularly Bitcoins).
Comparable current regulations are the protection of
photographers under German law (German Copyright
Act, s 72) and the protection of phonogram producers
(German Copyright Act, s 85; cf Art 2(d) WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty,69 Art 2(d)).
The ownership of the right would be tied to the eco-
nomically responsible operator of equipment that gen-
erates the data (data producer).70 When determining
the right-holder by ascertaining the economic responsi-
bility for the processing of goods one can find parallels
in the determination of the processor according to s
950 of the German Civil Code (acquiring property by
processing tangible goods) or the person storing data
protected under criminal law pursuant to s 202a and s
303a of the German Criminal Code. No distinction
should be made between data production by entrepre-
neurial activities and by consumer behaviour.71
The scope of protection would in particular include
the use by carrying out statistical analyses, but not the
re-creation of the same data by independent measure-
ment. Here a parallel with the already mentioned
Article 19(2) CDR72 is found.
Regarding limitations and exceptions, special atten-
tion should be paid to the interest of the public do-
main. A short term of protection would be appropriate.
There also is no need to exclude private parties as possi-
ble right holders but it seems reasonable to grant pro-
tection only against commercial infringements. Merely
allowing for private use as an exemption (as with data-
base producer rights under section 87(c) I para 1 of the
German Copyright Act; Article 9(a) Directive 96/9/EC:
extraction for private purposes) seems too narrow. A
possible wording would be as for example s 11 para 1
of the German Patent Act or s 40 para 1 of the German
Design Act (also the Agreement on a Unified Patent
Court, Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, signed 19
February 2013, not yet in force, 2013/C 175/01. Art
27(a): acts done privately and for non-commercial pur-
poses). The cumulative requirement of a ‘private do-
main’ should possibly be adapted to a world of data
that can no longer be spatially delimited. An exemption
guaranteeing scientific freedom comparable to Article
9(b) of Directive 96/9/EC seems to be appropriate.
The right should be transferable, since the creation
of markets for data is one of the main purposes of the
new law. Another main purpose (probably the decisive
one) lies in a fair and efficient allocation of the benefits
of data use. Within the framework of contract law it
would be necessary to consider whether the allocation
to the producer should be a role model and accordingly
whether the unrequited transfer by stipulating clauses
should be restricted. A corresponding consideration
will have to be recognized in an offer of better or
cheaper services.73
68 See also H Zech, ‘Daten als Wirtschaftsgut - €Uberlegungen zu
einem “Recht des Datenerzeugers” ’ (2015) Computer und Recht 137,
144 ff.
69 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), signed 20
December 1996, entered into force 20 May 2002, 2186 UNTS 203.
70 In a similar sense Becker, above, n 14, who points out, that this also leads
to a run in parallel with the protection of trade secrets of the machine
operator, who ‘usually plays the key role in producing the data’ (‘idR den
gro¨ßten Anteil an der Datenerzeugung hat’).
71 Similar T Hoeren, ‘Dateneigentum - Versuch einer Anwendung von
§ 303a StGB im Zivilrecht,’ MultiMedia und Recht 2013, 486, 487;
G Hornung and T Goeble, ‘ “Data Ownership” im vernetzten Automobil’
(2015) CR 265 (271). Contra: Becker, above, n 14, who instead recom-
mends a ‘right to products without data collection’ (‘Recht auf datener-
hebungsfreie Produkte’) for consumers and a right to use data for
businesses only. Argument: ‘It argues against an allocation decision, if
the person entitled in principle has no use for the allocated good, and it
is thus allocated only for the purpose of disposal’ (‘Es spricht gegen eine
Zuweisungsentscheidung, wenn der Berechtigte prinzipiell keine
Verwendung fu¨r das zugewiesene Lebensgut hat, es also nur zum Zwecke
der Ver€außerung zugewiesen wird.’) However, this is also true, eg for
patents that are granted a construction office. Hornung and Goeble, 272,
see political problems:
The legislator could, for example, be trying to protect traditional
(German) vehicle manufacturers of an impending loss of importance
that it assigns them the exclusive right of use of anonymized vehicle-re-
lated data and the right to sell them on the uprising data marketplaces
to third parties. At first sight, such an exclusive assignment would
strengthen the position of producers and give them a good position to
negotiate pricing. On closer inspection, however, this is less sure when
it comes to negotiations with worldwide operating interested parties.
So ko¨nnte der Gesetzgeber beispielsweise versucht sein, die traditio-
nellen (deutschen) Kfz-Hersteller dadurch vor einem drohenden
Bedeutungsverlust zu schu¨tzen, dass er ihnen die exklusive
Nutzungsbefugnis an anonymisierten fahrzeugbezogenen Daten und
das Recht zuweist, diese auf den entstehenden Datenmarktpl€atzen an
Dritte zu ver€außern. Auf den ersten Blick wu¨rde eine solche exklusive
Zuweisung die Position der Hersteller st€arken und ihnen eine gute
Verhandlungsposition fu¨r die Preisbildung geben. Bei n€aherem
Hinsehen ist dies jedoch weniger sicher, wenn es um Verhandlungen
mit weltweit operierenden Interessenten geht.
72 Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002, above, n 45.
73 Possible contractual models: pricing with two different prices (one with-
out and one with transfer of future rights to the produced data), lease
contract (economic operator is the lessee), rental contract (economic op-
erator is the landlord).
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Finally, questions of the interplay with existing
rights, particularly data protection law, would have to
be clarified. Here, a juxtaposition of various allocation
systems would need to be assumed. In any case, the
right of the data producer cannot displace the protec-
tion of the person concerned.
This leads to the question whether such a right
should be created or not. On the one hand, there are
significant concerns about the resulting restrictions of
the public domain. On the other hand, as in classic in-
tellectual property rights, one could bring forward the
argument that incentives are created to generate and to
reveal data (and hence, indirectly, to promote innova-
tions that are made possible through the use of data)
and that markets for information goods (that otherwise
would not be tradable or would only be tradable with
higher transaction costs) are created. Another impor-
tant aspect seems to be that such legal regulation would
clearly determine who benefits from the use of data.
This would prevent that machines are designed in a
way that they are difficult to be read out or that other
mechanisms would be created which grant de facto ex-
clusivity. Such a regulation not only saves costs, but
would promote a culture of transparency, as ‘open data’
does. The data producer right would have the same
function for ‘open data’ as the copyright has for ‘open
source’ and ‘open content’.
Conclusion
Data protection and potential rights to use data serve
different purposes. Rights to use data can create a func-
tioning market for data and so help building an infor-
mation economy. It is at least worth considering the
establishment of a right of the data producer. Preferably
a uniform right should be created, regardless of whether
a company or a consumer act as data producers. Due to
the economic importance and the enormous implica-
tions of such a right a broad social discussion and clari-
fication through legislative action are desirable.
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